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Abstract 
Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil and gas operations (also known as Offshore 
Safety Directive - OSD) was published in 2013 with the aim of establishing minimum 
requirements for major accident prevention in offshore oil and gas operations and for 
limiting the consequences should such events occur.  
In accordance with the provisions of Article 41, Member States (MS) were obliged to 
complete the process of transposition of the Directive at national level by July 2015, and 
their appointed Competent Authorities (CA) for offshore safety were required to start 
applying in practice the provisions in their daily operations. 
Particularly in relation to existing installations – all laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with the Offshore Safety Directive had to be implemented by 
July 19th, 2018 at the latest, as specified in the transitional provisions of Article 42. 
On 26th -28th November 2018, the technical workshop entitled "Sharing EUOAG members’ 
experiences and practices in implementing their Competent Authorities' arrangements" was 
organised by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) – with the support of the Directorate-General 
for Energy (DG ENER) - in Ispra, Italy.  
The main purpose of the event was to provide opportunities to Member States for sharing 
and reviewing their experiences and practices in the development of their Competent 
Authority's arrangements for complying with the requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU. 
The present report summarises the main conclusions from that event, and identifies 
potential issues for further consideration by individual EU MS Competent Authorities, the 
European Union Offshore Oil and Gas Authorities Group (EUOAG) and the European 
Commission's Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER).  
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1 Introduction 
Directive 2013/30/EU (also known as Offshore Safety Directive - OSD) was published in 2013 
with the aim of establishing minimum requirements for major accident prevention in 
offshore oil and gas operations and for limiting the consequences should such events occur. 
Member States were obliged to complete the process of transposition of the Directive at 
national level by July 2015, and their appointed Competent Authorities for offshore safety 
were required to start applying the provisions in their daily operations. However, in relation 
to existing installations, all laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to 
comply with the OSD had to be implemented by July 19th, 2018 at the latest.   
This workshop – supported by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Energy 
(DG ENER) and organized by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) - was 
the first workshop to be held following the deadline of July 19th 2018. It aimed at providing 
an opportunity for Member States to share and review their experiences and practices in the 
development of their Competent Authority's arrangements. The workshop also aimed at 
stimulating interactions and discussions between participants about any major difficulties 
encountered and the main challenges to be faced in the future in relation to the 
requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU.  
The event had the following objectives:  
 To gather knowledge of the current practices and processes followed by Competent 
Authorities for carrying out their main regulatory functions, and to review 
experiences in implementing the Competent Authority requirements of the Offshore 
Safety Directive; 
 To explore the current arrangements followed by the Member States concerning well 
operations and combined operations, and to identify good Competent Authority 
practices; 
 To highlight and discuss the main challenges that Competent Authorities will face as 
the European offshore industry changes in the future; 
 To share information on the arrangements in place for the preparation of Competent 
Authority's documentation. 
The detailed topics for this workshop were selected from suggestions from EUOAG 
members, and the event was a mixture of presentations, small group exercises, and plenary 
discussions in five sessions: 
• Session I – Overall experiences of Competent Authority arrangements; 
• Session II – Well operations, Workovers and Interventions; 
• Session III – How can Competent Authorities respond to future changes in the 
offshore industry? 
• Session IV – Combined Operations; 
• Session V – Competent Authority documentation. 
The complete workshop material, i.e. agenda, presentations and group exercises, is publicly 
available on the Workshops and Training Courses section of the Virtual Centre of Offshore 
Safety Expertise (ViCOS) website: https://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/vicos/.  
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Participation to the workshop was open to the EUOAG Members and to the Representatives 
of Third Countries, the Industrial Associations and the Unions at the EUOAG, and to all 
Member States' authorities involved in the implementation of the requirements of the 
Directive at the national level.  
A total of forty (40) participants attended. The event saw the participation of delegates from 
numerous EU Competent Authorities (CY, DE, DK, EL, ES, HR, IE, IT, NL, PT, RO, UK) and 
Norway, Third Countries (LEB, ME), Industrial Associations (IOGP, IMCA, ECSA) and 
companies (Edison E&P, INA Jadran), certification societies (RINA Services), and academia 
(Polytechnic of Turin). 
The purpose of this report is to summarise the discussions and main conclusions from the 
event, and to identify potential issues for further consideration by individual EU Competent 
Authorities, EUOAG and the European Commission (particularly via the current process of 
review of Directive 2013/30/EU). 
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2 Session I: Overall experiences of Competent Authorities' 
arrangements 
Session I involved presentations from the Croatian Hydrocarbon Agency (CHA) and the 
Committee for Safety of Offshore Operations of Italy to describe their experiences in setting 
up their respective Competent Authorities, a presentation from the International Association 
of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) about the industry view of how the OSD Competent 
Authority arrangements are now working, and the concluding Group Exercise #1 (the full 
text of the exercise is found in Annex 2).  The exercise explored these issues more in depth in 
a small group environment, in order to identify what was working well and less well, what 
were the continuing challenges for competent authorities, and to develop ideas for future 
work in these areas.    
It was clear that the significant changes in offshore safety and environmental regulation, 
brought about by the OSD, had created structures and responsibilities which encouraged 
improved joint working, both within Member States’ authorities (with the new CA 
structure/responsibilities bringing together safety and environmental authorities and 
creating opportunities for closer cross-departmental working with other authorities such as 
those primarily responsible for emergency response) and between Member States' CAs and 
their industry/stakeholders. For instance, feedback indicated that the formal tripartite 
consultation arrangements introduced by the OSD appeared to work well, although MSs 
where offshore Unions were not in place had greater challenges with this. The improved 
dialogue between the industry and its regulators was recognised by IOGP. The OSD changes 
had also provided an environment to streamline regulatory processes, albeit sometimes at 
the initial cost of significant workload to develop appropriate documentation.   
Inevitably, there were areas where the introduction of the CA arrangements were working 
less well. A common issue (mentioned in a number of the workshop sessions) for some MSs 
concerned the implementation of the OSD requirements over existing legislation and 
arrangements, with some of the old systems and requirements continuing in place when the 
OSD CA arrangements had already been introduced. This had the potential for reducing the 
consistency/impact of the OSD as the EU’s major hazard offshore regulatory system, for 
instance by retaining additional requirements outside the OSD major hazard framework. This 
implied that there could still be scope in some MSs for further integration of MS competent 
authority regulatory activities and/or legislation. As pointed out by one delegate, there were 
advantages of “screening the existing system first”.  
Differing models of CA structures have been chosen, and it was clear that there is no “one 
size to fit all”. A CA for a MS with very few installations and intermittent activity will, of 
necessity, be very different from those CAs with sizeable numbers of installations and 
constant offshore activity. Some of the smaller or less mature CAs also faced particular 
issues of training/competence, and having to juggle the initial use of consultants with 
developing/recruiting their own internal resources. Most CAs involved a matrix of (often 
existing) organisations operating under the umbrella of the CA, and this provided challenges 
of coordination, balancing different points of view and competence, and ensuring that the 
CA activities were as efficient as possible.  
Issues of “interpretation” of the OSD itself were also still apparent, with a recurring issue 
being uncertainties about the scope and role of the independent verification requirements 
(further discussed in Session II). Other interpretation/definition issues, such as what is 
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considered a well operation and a combined operation, were explored further in Sessions II 
& IV respectively.  
Although the CA arrangements for each MS should now be fully implemented, the value of 
continuing mutual help between CAs was emphasised regularly during the workshop. The 
examples often quoted concerned interchange or joint activities between CA staff, but this 
was not as common as some would wish, and there was scope for making this mutual 
sharing of expertise and practices more frequent. This was felt to be particularly important 
for those CAs who are less experienced.    
The role of EUOAG was also valued, particularly within workshop settings like this event. 
Some felt, though, that the agendas for the formal EUOAG meetings could be more relevant 
to their needs. The role of EUOAG in providing clarification on some of the OSD definitions, 
and verifying the consistency of implementation amongst MSs was also mentioned, although 
there is an overlap with DG ENER’s responsibilities. With respect to the OSD review carried 
out by the European Commission's DG ENER, the workshop provided strong and consistent 
views from CAs that the OSD arrangements were still developing as CAs gained experience in 
working, and there was a wish for more guidance and work to ensure consistency and 
efficiency of implementation of the existing approach rather than further legislative changes 
at this early stage.    
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3 Session II: Well Operations, Workovers and Interventions 
Session II started with two technical presentations from the industry. The first provided the 
views of the Croatian offshore company, INA Jadran, about the different types of well 
workovers and well interventions1 they undertake, the equipment used, the major hazard 
well controls, and some implications of the well operation requirements of the OSD from 
their perspective. The second industry presentation, from Edison Exploration & Production, 
highlighted the causes of well control failures and the range of risk mitigation strategies.  
Presentations from the industry were followed by the contribution from the Danish Working 
Environment Authority (DWEA), who explained why well workovers/interventions were a 
focus for the industry in Denmark, introduced the recently published DWEA guidelines on 
offshore well operations, and explained the Danish approach (which sometimes went 
beyond the OSD requirements) to well operation notifications, approvals and reports.  
The Session concluded with two Group Exercises: 
 Group Exercise #2 was aimed at sharing CA experiences in responding to well 
operation notifications, to identify good and best practices, and to consider the OSD 
well design/control verification requirements; 
 Group Exercise #3 undertook a similar task with respect to how CAs respond to the 
weekly reports of well operations required by the OSD.  
The full texts of both group exercises are available in Annex 2. 
There was general consensus over what operations were included in the OSD definition of a 
“well operation”. This included all coil tubing interventions, work via wireline and slickline, 
and snubbing operations, which all had the propensity to lead to loss of well control and 
hence to a major accident.  
There was recognition, though, that not all “well operations” presented the same levels of 
risks, so some CAs had differing requirements for high risk well operations compared to 
more routine well intervention work – for instance, allowing generic notifications for 
standard intervention operations on an installation or shorter notification timescales. 
There was wide variation between the approaches adopted by CAs upon the receipt of a well 
operation notification. These ranged from a formal and lengthy CA approval process before 
well operations could start, to one where CAs simply noted that they had no objections to 
the notification. Similarly, the range of notification deadlines was wide, with one CA needing 
notification six months before the planned operation, whereas others only requiring ten 
days.  
There was recognition, though, that factors such as the CA maturity/experience, the 
numbers of anticipated notifications, and the political climate could all affect the systems 
and timescales which CAs operated for well operation notifications.   
Some competent authorities were uncertain about the types of well operation notifications 
they should expect following urgent changes in a drilling programme. They suggested 
pragmatic approaches, for instance well kill operations being allowed to proceed without 
any additional notification, whereas non-emergency changes to the well programme 
                                           
1 ”Well workovers” refer to well operations which entail the removal of the Xmas tree, and are most often 
performed with a separate MODU over the wellbore.   
“Well interventions” refer to well operations which can be undertaken through an existing Xmas tree, usually by 
equipment such as wireline or slickline from the installation itself.   
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requiring re-notification. Interestingly, during this debate no one referenced the 
requirements of OSD Article 15(3), whereby well operators should “immediately inform the 
competent authority of any material change to the submitted notification of well operations.  
The competent authority shall consider those changes and, if deemed necessary, take 
appropriate action.” It therefore seems that this uncertainty can be easily resolved, as the 
Directive is clear. 
Group Exercise #2 provided an opportunity to CAs to discuss issues of independent 
verification of well design and well control. It was clear that there is uncertainty about the 
scope of this well verification compared to the verification work of the SECEs of the 
installation(s). There was also an inconsistency of approaches towards Independent 
Verification Bodies (IVBs), with some CAs formally approving IVBs whereas others relying on 
the generic requirements in the OSD for operators/owners to only select appropriately 
independent and competent bodies/individuals.    
Group Exercise #2 introduced a set of assessment guidelines for well operation notifications 
which had been developed by the JRC. There were no objections to these, with comments 
that they were broadly similar to the standards used by some CAs. Those CAs who do not 
have comprehensive assessment procedures for well operation notifications may therefore 
find those guidelines helpful. In particular, the importance of the notification including both 
the independent well design/control verification report and the well operator’s response (to 
make sure the verification report had been treated seriously) was stressed.   
With respect to the OSD requirements for CAs to receive specific information in weekly 
reports of well operations, Group Exercise #3 identified a wide range of practices by CAs, 
often significantly in excess of the requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU in terms of 
information required, format, and frequency. Those CAs who required daily reports – which 
were common – used the information to undertake a “real time” assessment of the progress 
of the well operation so they could react straight away, whereas those CA who relied on the 
OSD weekly reports accepted that the information was more historical but still provided an 
opportunity for the CA to monitor progress and detect deviations in the well programme. 
The point was made that for those MS with only limited drilling activity in their waters, 
individual drilling programmes can have a particularly high “political” profile. Hence, the 
desire from those CAs to be able to monitor progress on a day-by-day basis via weekly 
reports. Conversely, in MS where offshore drilling activity was more common, well 
operations tend to have a lower profile, so for those CAs the OSD weekly information 
requirements may be adequate for their oversight purposes.  
The need to involve wells specialist expertise to scrutinise this technical information was also 
raised, with the UK highlighting that if they went to daily well operation reports it would 
require the technical scrutiny of around 25,000 such reports every year.  
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4 Session III: How can Competent Authorities respond to 
future changes in the offshore industry? 
Session III provided an opportunity for delegates to look at their CA arrangements in relation 
to future challenges, with initial presentations from IOGP and DG ENER providing a platform 
for the discussions.  
IOGP provided a positive view of the future changes which are likely to take place in the 
European offshore industry, with significant finds still being discovered in the North Sea and 
the Mediterranean. Over the next 25 years, it was estimated that around 50% of the 
European Union’s gas requirements would be provided from EU/Norway reserves, and a 
lower but still significant level of 25% of EU’s oil supplies being similarly met over the next 20 
years.   
Although there was a gradual reduction in investment in the North Sea, accompanied by a 
significant change in the offshore operators, private equity specialist companies were 
replacing the oil majors. The advantages of these company changes included an initial 
increase in investment and concentration on enhancing recovery, but with a tight focus on 
cost control and a concern to reduce obstacles to increasing production (such as easing 
access to existing infrastructure and flexible licences). However, the new companies have a 
shorter time horizon than the majors they are replacing, so are likely to leave quickly should 
profitability be threatened.  
The IOGP presentation also highlighted the continuing use of innovative technology such as 
robotics, and also the growing de-carbonisation pressures which could encourage the 
development of carbon capture offshore. 
DG ENER gave a brief review of the implementation of the OSD, which they considered had 
gone well compared to some other major directives. They would be following up some 
implementation issues, though, with MS in due course. In the meantime, work was in 
progress to undertake the review of Article 40 of Directive 2013/30/EU, with a public 
consultation exercise closing at the end of December 2018. DG ENER provided delegates 
with details of the process which would lead up to the review report for the European 
Parliament/Council by July 2019. It was emphasised that there were no firm proposals for 
amending the OSD, although issues raised so far included decommissioning, cyber security, 
independent verification, and mutual recognition of MODUs.  
With the general background established, the workshop then heard two presentations 
relating to the challenges from the maturing nature of Europe’s offshore industry.  
RINA services, a company experienced in providing engineering consultancy and certification 
services for offshore platforms in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, described their 
approach toward ageing platforms. Their reassessment process provided an example of the 
types of technology and engineering tools which are available to operators to manage their 
ageing offshore platforms and their possible life extension, taking into account continuing 
safety and environmental protection as well as commercial cost-benefit issues.  
This presentation was followed by a contribution from the UK Offshore Safety Directive 
Regulator (OSDR), which described the range of oversight programmes they had run over 
many years to assess how the UK offshore industry was managing their ageing asset 
challenges.  
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These two presentations on ageing assets provided a clear lesson for CAs - the management 
of ageing offshore installations by the industry and the monitoring of the effectiveness of 
those measures by CAs are complex long-term issues and cannot be instigated or resolved 
quickly or easily.  
With ageing assets and their life extension being a fact of life in EU waters, CAs will need to 
be able to assess a wide range of indicators to build up a picture of whether their operators 
are able to professionally manage ageing assets, and the tools within the OSD for RoMH 
periodic reviews, CA directed reviews and material change revisions can all play a part. The 
experience from UK's OSDR was that CA oversight of ageing assets could not adopt a simple 
“find and fix” approach, but rather one of assessing their operators’ abilities to managing 
such issues themselves.  
The range of indicators which CAs can use as part of their oversight strategies could usefully 
include company Operational Risk Assessment (ORA) systems, their performance in 
managing their maintenance backlog, the quality of safety leadership, and the use of 
verification to manage potentially deteriorating plant and equipment. The quality of CAs’ 
continuing dialogue with top management (not just when there are problems) was identified 
as a key influencing factor.  
All ageing installations will inevitably finally cease operation and production, so the Dutch 
CA, i.e. State Supervision of Mines (SSM), then presented their experiences on 
decommissioning of offshore platforms. Since 1997, 22 Dutch installations have been 
decommissioned and removed, and delegates were reminded that decisions on offshore 
installation decommissioning would involve not just the OSD CAs, but often other Ministries 
involved in licensing, economic affairs, and longer term maritime environmental issues.  
SSM's experience has been positive, with no major incidents during decommissioning 
activities, and they have been able to maintain a low profile of regulatory activity during this 
phase of the installation life cycle. Well Plugging & Abandonment (P&A) is covered by the 
normal OSD well operation notification, where NL reference the NOGEPA Standard 45, 
although it was mentioned that the NSOAF were interested in better harmonisation 
between MS on standards for well abandonment.  
Looking into the future, the rate of installation decommissioning will increase in the next ten 
years, with around 50% of NL’s 155 offshore installations to be decommissioned between 
2017 and 2026. Although SSM regulatory experience has been a “light touch”, they identified 
the continuity financial liability for P&A wells, and decisions about when to remove 
installations and connecting infrastructure after the cessation of production, as issues which 
may be outside the OSD.  
The last presentation in this session took forward a key issue from IOGP’s presentation, 
namely how can CAs respond to changes in installation ownership. The presentation from 
the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) described a picture of significant selling of 
assets and amalgamation of companies working in their waters, which brought a variety of 
benefits such as commitment for investment, enthusiasm for new technology and ideas, and 
leaner management cultures with less bureaucracy. However, there were also significant 
challenges related to the loss of competence in the smaller companies (with the loss of the 
centralised technical expertise in the old “majors”), lack of experience in working in the 
region, a narrower risk awareness, building up new safety cultures and merging old/new 
management systems. There was a similar picture with MODUs, with a more challenging 
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commercial environment leading to acquisitions and mergers, reduced crew, lower rates 
with less maintenance time in the contract, centralisation of some functions outside of 
Norway's part of the business, and a cycle of cold stacking and reactivation of MODUs.  
PSA's experience was of increasing major hazard risks within the MODU fleet, echoing a 
point made by Edison's presentation in Session II that worldwide well control incidents were 
increasing.  
Via case studies, the presentation went on to describe the CA approach to such 
organisational and company changes. Although Norway does not implement the OSD, the CA 
milestones of its involvement during the life cycle of an installation were broadly similar to 
those required by the OSD. Their key approach was to undertake “business transfer audits” 
for the new company at an early stage, reviewing its risk assessment and scrutinising the 
proposed change management processes, competency and workforce involvement 
capabilities. More focused installation-based audits would follow later. 
The presentation also echoed some of the points raised in the earlier presentation from the 
UK, in so far as their approach was a combination of “watchdog” and “guidedog”, with the 
objective of making sure Norwegian companies can manage their own risk rather than 
relying on CA actions.   
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5 Session IV: Combined Operations 
Session IV provided delegates with the opportunity, via Group Exercise #4, to develop 
consensus about what activities came within the definition of a “combined operation” (CO), 
and to share different approaches on how CAs respond to CO notifications.  
The full text of Group Exercise #4 is available in Annex 2. 
It quickly became clear that there is divergence over what activities different CAs consider as 
“combined operations”. Some CAs make the link directly with the OSD, which requires 
operations between two or more installations, whereas others take a wider view and 
consider any simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) between an installation and other vessels 
such as diving support vessel, pipeline laying vessel, or construction barge (which are not 
“installations” as defined in the OSD2) as also being covered by the term CO. There was also 
uncertainty for some operations, such as whether a MODU working over a subsea template 
controlled by a remote installation was also a CO within the OSD definition. 
Differing approaches were adopted when a CA receives a CO notification. The timetable for 
the notification submission varied considerably, from 21 days to 6 months prior to the start 
of the CO, depending on the CA. At least one CA went through a formal “approval” process 
when they received a CO notification, and another would inspect both installations prior to 
the CO taking place. Others adopted a lighter approach, assessing the notification against 
defined guidelines and returning the notification to the operator if there were concerns.  
Issues relating to the bridging documentation and joint emergency response arrangements 
were highlighted as key issues for the assessment of such a notification. The guidelines for 
CO notification assessment contained in the JRC publication “Guidelines for the Assessment 
of Reports on Major Hazards based on the requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU” [1] were 
felt to be a minimum, but a number of the groups felt that it could be expanded. 
Delegates recognised that as some CAs had little experience in using the OSD for COs, it was 
difficult to establish good practice. It was felt that EUOAG could have a role in providing 
more consistency of approach towards COs, and one suggestion was that EUOAG could 
provide a CO case study to enable competent authorities to test their own procedures. 
 
  
                                           
2 Article 2(19) 
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6 Session V: Competent Authority documentation 
In session V, a summary of the rather confusing and at times overlapping documentation 
requirements in Articles 8 & 9 and Annex III the OSD was provided.  
A paper named “How transparent are EU Offshore Competent Authorities?” prepared by 
the chair of the workshop was presented, which reminded delegates of the post Deepwater 
Horizon drive for greater openness by CAs and the specific requirements in the OSD for 
making certain types of information more freely available. The paper described how a 
“secret shopper” survey had been undertaken to assess the transparency, quality and scope 
of information which ten EU offshore CAs had on their website in compliance with OSD 
requirements.  
The results of that informal assessment were mixed – the anonymised table of results 
showed that only three of the CA websites were clear and easy to understand and 
substantially provided all the necessary transparency information. Of the remaining seven 
websites, three needed improvement to make their information comprehensive, but four 
had significant omissions, with key information either missing, out-of-date or inadequately 
presented.  
The subsequent Group Exercise #5 took the discussion on these issues further (see Annex 2 
for the full text of the exercise). The anonymised results of the “secret shopper” survey of CA 
websites attracted a lot of interest. One of the key reasons for some of the poorer showing 
appeared to be lack of priority given to transparency and communication issues, and this 
was particularly a problem when website management was outside the direct control of the 
CA. The commitment of resources to continually update CA websites, for example to 
respond to re-organisations, new processes or recent incidents, was also mentioned. A 
challenge for CAs which comprised a number of different organisations was to ensure that 
the CA website had clear and effective links to information on the activities of the 
constituent organisations.    
Group Exercise #5 then explored how CAs delivered their OSD obligation to make “annual 
plans for effective oversight”. All those CAs with an active offshore industry had annual 
plans, but their purpose and complexity varied. Some of the plans were for internal purposes 
only, used to set “business” objectives and for monitoring subsequent operational 
performance. Some were more detailed, even down to individual installation annual 
oversight plans, and one CA published a time-bound strategy for how it undertakes the 
oversight of its offshore industry with appropriate targets for different types of intervention 
activity. Some CAs had difficulty in deciding how to reflect the non-planned nature of its 
reactive work (for example, investigations) in an annual plan, but others were able to reflect 
this by allocating time/resources to such inevitable work. The practices of sharing annual CA 
plans with the industry also varied – some communicated only generic plans (informally or 
formally), whereas others were more willing to share more detailed plans with installations' 
operators/owners.  
The last task of this Group Exercise was for delegates to consider the purpose of the OSD 
requirement for all CAs to prepare a “policy statement”, and then to identify any good/best 
practice. Time for this task was limited, though, so discussion only highlighted that several 
CAs either hadn’t prepared such statements or did not publish them externally. One CA 
explained the difficulty in preparing a CA policy statement when other national authorities 
duplicated its CA tasks.  
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One interesting example of good practice was provided by PSA Norway, who have a video on 
its website to provide an easily accessible explanation of its policy in providing its offshore 
regulatory activities. 
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7 Conclusions and potential further actions 
The overall feedback from delegates after this event was very positive, and this report of the 
discussions and conclusions provides a legacy document from the workshop. However, in 
order to provide a mechanism for taking some of the conclusions further, this section 
identifies a range of potential actions which could be appropriate, split into those 
appropriate for Member State CAs to consider, those better addressed by EUOAG and, 
finally, those which may be more appropriate for the European Commission to consider, 
mainly (although not exclusively) via the review of Directive 2013/30/EU.  
Potential further actions for consideration by individual CAs 
i. Where MSs have implemented the OSD CA requirements over existing legislation and 
arrangements, a review of the value of the old systems and requirements which 
remain in place now that the OSD CA arrangements have been fully introduced may 
be appropriate; 
ii. The value of continuing mutual help between CAs was emphasised regularly during 
the workshop, especially interchange or joint activities between CA staff. This was 
not as common as some would wish, so the more experienced/mature EUOAG CAs 
may like to consider whether they could increase the frequency of such mutual 
sharing of expertise;    
iii. Some CAs were uncertain about the types of well operation notifications they should 
expect following urgent changes in a drilling programme. CAs are reminded of the 
requirements of Article 15(3) of the OSD, whereby well operators should 
“immediately inform the competent authority of any material change to the 
submitted notification of well operations. The competent authority shall consider 
those changes and, if deemed necessary, take appropriate action.” It therefore seems 
that this uncertainty can be easily resolved, as the OSD is clear; 
iv. Group Exercise #2 introduced a set of assessment guidelines for well operation 
notifications which had been developed by the JRC, and there were no objections to 
these. Those CAs who do not have comprehensive assessment procedures for well 
operation notifications may therefore find those guidelines helpful;  
v. A clear conclusion from the workshop was that CA monitoring of the effectiveness of 
the management of ageing offshore installations by the industry was a complex long-
term issue which could not be instigated or resolved quickly or easily. CAs may like to 
consider the need to look at a wide range of indicators to judge whether their 
operators are able to professionally manage ageing assets, and the tools within the 
OSD (i.e. RoMH periodic reviews, CA directed reviews and material change revisions) 
can all play a part. The range of indicators which CAs can use as part of their 
oversight strategies could usefully include company Operational Risk Assessment 
(ORA) systems, their performance in managing their maintenance backlog, the 
quality of safety leadership, and the use of verification to manage potentially 
deteriorating plant and equipment;  
vi. In relation to how CAs can respond to changes in installation ownership, the 
Norwegian CA’s approach may be of relevance to other EUOAG CAs. Their key 
mechanism was to undertake “business transfer audits” for the new company at an 
early stage, reviewing its risk assessment and scrutinising the proposed change 
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management processes, competency and workforce involvement capabilities. More 
focused installation-based audits could follow later; 
vii. CAs may like to re-assess what activities they consider requiring notification as a 
“combined operation”, in the interests of consistency of approaches across EUOAG 
members. Although some CAs link directly with the formal definition in the OSD, 
which requires operations between two or more installations to be notified, others 
go beyond the OSD by considering that any simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) 
between an installation and other vessels should also be covered by the term 
“combined operation” and hence trigger the notification requirements;    
viii. The guidelines for combined operation notification assessment contained in the JRC 
publication “Guidelines for the Assessment of Reports on Major Hazards based on the 
requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU” [1] were felt to be a minimum, with the 
assessment of the bridging documentation and joint emergency response 
arrangements particularly identified as key issues; 
ix. CAs may like to reassess the adequacy of their transparency arrangements, in the 
light of the informal findings of the “secret shopper” survey of their websites. The 
paper presented at the workshop gave some indications of the range of effective 
website indicators. Key reasons for some of the poorer showings appeared to be lack 
of priority given to transparency and communication issues (particularly when 
website management was outside the direct control of the CA) and the availability of 
resources needed to continually update CA websites to respond to re-organisations, 
new processes or recent incidents.  
 Potential further actions for consideration by EUOAG 
i. The value of continuing mutual help between CAs was emphasised regularly during 
the workshop, but this was not as common as some would wish. EUOAG may like to 
explore what action can be taken to better encourage/facilitate the mutual sharing of 
expertise and practices via interchanges between the more experienced and less 
experienced EUOAG members;    
ii. EUOAG should note the CAs’ view of the value of workshops in any future EUOAG 
work plans; 
iii. There were suggestions that EUOAG could assist in providing clarification on some of 
the OSD definitions and verifying the consistency of implementation amongst MS. For 
instance, there was continuing uncertainty about the scope of well verification 
compared to the verification work of the SECEs of the installation(s), and 
inconsistency of approaches towards IVBs by CAs;   
iv. It was felt that EUOAG could have a role in helping CAs to improve their consistency 
of approach towards combined operations. One suggestion was that EUOAG could 
provide a CO case study to enable CAs to test their own procedures; 
v. The “secret shopper” survey of CA websites attracted a lot of interest and identified 
inconsistencies in the CA transparency requirements of the OSD.  This could be 
another topic of continuing interest by EUOAG;  
vi. Discussions arising from the group exercise on the OSD obligation for CAs to make 
“annual plans for effective oversight” showed that their purpose and complexity 
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varied and there was a general lack of a consistent approach. Again, this could be 
another topic of continuing interest by EUOAG. 
Potential further action by the European Commission 
With respect to the review of Directive 2013/30/EU currently under discussion by the 
European Commission, the workshop provided strong and consistent views from CAs that 
the OSD arrangements were still developing as CAs gained experience in working, and there 
was a wish for more guidance and work to ensure consistence and efficiency of 
implementation of the existing approach rather than further legislative changes at this early 
stage.    
However, the wide-ranging discussions between EUOAG members, reported in Sections 2-6 
on their experiences and practices of implementing the CA requirements of the OSD, may be 
relevant for consideration by the OSD review. In particular: 
i. A common issue was that some MS had implemented the OSD CA requirements over 
existing legislation and arrangements, with some of the old systems and 
requirements continuing in place when the OSD CA arrangements are introduced.   
This had the potential for reducing the consistency/impact of the OSD as the EU’s 
major hazard offshore regulatory system, for instance by retaining additional 
requirements outside the OSD major hazard framework. This implied that there could 
still be scope in some MS for further integration of MS competent authority 
regulatory activities and/or legislation; 
ii. There was a desire from some CAs for assistance in clarifying some of the OSD 
definitions; 
iii. Some inconsistencies in OSD implementation amongst MS were also identified;   
iv. There was wide variation between the approaches adopted by CAs upon the receipt 
of a well operation notification;   
v. There was some uncertainty about the scope of well verification compared to the 
verification work of the SECEs of the installation(s). There was also an inconsistency 
of approaches towards IVBs;   
vi. With respect to the OSD requirement for weekly well operation reports, discussions 
identified a wide range of practices by CAs, some significantly in excess of the OSD 
requirements in terms of the information required, the format, and the frequency;   
vii. There is divergence over what activities CAs consider as “combined operations”.  
Some make the link directly with the OSD definition, whereas others take a wider 
view and apply the combined operation notification requirements to any 
simultaneous operations between an installation and other vessels such as diving 
support vessels, pipeline laying vessels, or construction barges;    
viii. The “secret shopper” survey of CA websites attracted a lot of interest and identified 
significant inconsistencies in the delivery of the CA transparency/communication 
requirements of the OSD.   
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List of abbreviations and definitions 
CA  Competent Authority 
CO  Combined Operations 
DG ENER European Commission's Directorate-General for Energy 
EU  European Union 
EUOAG  European Union Offshore oil and gas Authorities Group 
IVB  Independent Verification Body 
JRC  European Commission's Joint Research Centre 
MODU  Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit 
MS  Member State 
NSOAF  North Sea Offshore Authorities Forum 
ORA  Operational Risk Assessment 
OSD  Offshore Safety Directive (Directive 2013/30/EU) 
P&A  Plugging & Abandonment 
RoMH  Report on Major Hazards 
SECE  Safety and Environmental Critical Element 
SIMOPS  Simultaneous Operations 
ViCOS  Virtual Centre of Offshore Safety expertise 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Agenda of the technical workshop 
26th November 2018 
Morning: Transfer of participants from the airports to the JRC Visitors' Centre 
13:00-14:00 Light Lunch & Registration  
14.00-14:20 Welcome and Opening of the Workshop 
14:00 - Welcome by the JRC and EUOAG co-chair and domestic arrangements (S. Tarantola – 
JRC, W. Kennedy – UK BEIS) 
  14:05 - Objectives and structure of the workshop (S. Walker) 
  14:10 - Brief delegates' introduction 
14:20-16:50 Session I – Overall experiences of Competent Authority arrangements 
14:20 – Experience of setting up a Competent Authority from scratch (V. Vaniček, D. Dobrinić 
– Croatian Hydrocarbon Agency) 
14:35 – Experience of adapting an existing offshore regulator body to the OSD Competent 
Authority model (R. Cianella – Italian Ministry of Economic Development, R. Gerboni – 
Polytechnic of Turin) 
14:50 – The Industry view on how the EU Competent Authorities are working (C. Schwarck - 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers) 
15:05 – Group Exercise (split into four groups): Reviewing Competent Authority's 
arrangements. To review the creation and introduction of their own CA arrangements, and to 
identify priorities for improvement in the future.  
16:05 – Coffee/Tea break 
  16:20 – Feedback from working groups and plenary discussion. 
16:50-18:30 Session II – Well Operations, Workovers and Interventions 
16:50 – Introductory presentation (S. Walker) 
16:55 – How the Industry faces these issues (H. Goreta – INAgip d.o.o., P. Cavanna – Edison) 
17:35 – Issues of concern to Competent Authorities (M. El Halimi – Danish Working 
Environment Authority) 
18:00 – Plenary discussion.    
18:30  End of Day One / Transfer to the Hotels 
20:00  Workshop Dinner for Delegates 
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27th November 2018 
08:00: Transfer of participants from the hotels to the JRC Visitors' Centre 
08:30: Tour of JRC Visitors' Centre 
09:00-09:15 Recap from the previous day  
09:15-12:15 Session II (cont'd) – Well Operations, Workovers and Interventions 
09:15 – Introduction to the Group Exercise (S. Walker) 
09:25 – Group Exercise (split into four groups): Well Operations Notifications. To share 
experiences of how CAs respond to well operation notifications, to identify best/good 
practice, and to consider the verification requirements for well design and well control. 
10:25 – Feedback from working groups and plenary discussion. 
11:00 – Coffee/Tea break 
11:15 – Group Exercise (split into four groups): Well Operation Weekly Reports. To provide an 
opportunity to share Competent Authorities' experiences and practices of handling weekly 
reports and to identify best/good practices.  
11:45 – Feedback from working groups and plenary discussion. 
12:15-13:00 Session III – How can Competent Authorities respond to future changes in the 
offshore industry? 
12:15 – Experiences with the Offshore Safety Directive and the way forward (J. Köhli – 
European Commission's DG ENER) 
12:35 – Overview of anticipated changes/challenges in Europe's offshore hydrocarbons 
industry (C. Schwarck - International Association of Oil and Gas Producers) 
13:00-14:00 Lunch break (buffet) 
14:00-18:00 Session III (cont'd) – How can Competent Authorities respond to future changes in 
the offshore industry? 
14:00 – Ensuring continuing safety and asset integrity of ageing assets. The industry's 
approach to life extension (S. Copello – RINA) and the Competent Authority response to 
ageing assets (D. Walker - UK HSE).  
15:30 – Competent authority response to decommissioning and well abandonment. Session 
covering the Competent Authority’s role in responding to decommissioning (A. van Gulik, H. 
Weenink – SSM The Netherlands) 
16:30 – Coffee/Tea break 
16:45 – Competent Authority response to changes in installation ownership – Session 
covering how Competent Authorities can respond to the “traditional” major oil companies 
disinvesting in offshore Europe and being replaced by smaller, newer companies (B. T. Bache 
– PSA Norway) 
18:00  End of Day Two / Transfer to the Hotels 
20:00  Workshop Dinner for Delegates 
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28th November 2018 
08:30: Transfer of participants from the hotels to the JRC Visitors' Centre 
09:00-10:45 Session IV – Combined Operations 
09:00 – Recap from previous day and introduction to the group exercise (S. Walker) 
09:10 – Group Exercise (split into four groups): Competent Authority Notifications. To develop 
consensus about activities which are "combined operations", to share different CA 
approaches to such notifications, and to identify any priorities for action. 
10:00 – Feedback from working groups and plenary discussion. 
10:30 – Coffee/Tea break 
10:45-12:15 Session V – Competent Authority documentation 
10:45 – Summary of OSD documentary requirements and introduction to the Group Exercise 
(S. Walker) 
10:55 – Group Exercise (split into four groups): Documentary requirements. To consider how 
CAs can better meet the openness/transparency requirements of the OSD, and to develop 
good practice for a range of formal OSD documentation, including CA Annual Plans and Policy 
Statements.  
11:40 – Feedback from working groups and plenary discussion. 
12:15-12:30 Conclusions 
12:15 – Wrap up session and workshop conclusions 
12:30  End of the Workshop  
12:30-13:30  Light Lunch 
14:00  Transfers to the Airport(s) 
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Annex 2. Group Exercises 
Group Exercise 1. Reviewing Competent Authority Arrangements 
Objectives: With the ending of the transitional provisions of Directive 2013/30/EU on 19 July 2018, 
this Group Exercise provides an opportunity for delegates to review how well the creation and 
introduction of their own Competent Authority arrangements has gone, and to identify priorities for 
improvements in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, elect a rapporteur to record the group’s discussions. 
Task 1 (15 minutes) 
Delegates from each Member State in the group briefly describe what changes were needed to set 
up their OSD Competent Authority, and how it was done. 
Task 2 (15 minutes)  
A group discussion to identify: 
a) Areas in which CA arrangements are working well;  
b) Areas in which CA arrangements are working less well; 
c) Areas which have represented the biggest challenge for Competent Authorities.  
Task 3 (15 minutes) 
In the light of the group discussion, identify (and prioritise!) ideas which could be taken forward to 
further improve the work of OSD Competent Authorities, including:- 
a) Via EUOAG; 
b) Via mutual help between CAs; 
c) Via the Review of Directive 2013/30/EU. 
 
Report back to plenary on Tasks 2 and 3 (5 minutes per group) 
  
Competent Authority arrangements can include the whole range of CA activities: 
 Assessment/acceptance of RoMHs and other notifications; 
 Undertaking inspection, investigation and enforcement activities; 
 Developing policies, processes and procedures; 
 Working with other bodies , including advising licensing authorities; 
 Ensuring independence and transparency of CA activities; 
 Developing tripartite consultation and confidential reporting mechanisms; 
 Provision of adequate resources, including training staff and using 3rd party 
consultants; 
 Securing adequate funding for Government and/or industry. 
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Group Exercise 2. Well Operations Notifications 
Objectives: this Group Exercise provides an opportunity for delegates to share experiences of how 
they respond to the well operation notifications which are now required by Directive 2013/30/EU, to 
identify good and best practises, and to consider the related well design/control verification 
requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, elect a (different) rapporteur to record the group’s discussions. 
Task 1 (10 minutes) 
Identify any uncertainties about what is a “well operation”. In particular, reach consensus about 
whether the following are well operations:- 
a) Coil tubing interventions; 
b) Installing/setting/retrieving devices by wireline (e.g. SSSVs); 
c) Using wireline operations to establish communication (e.g. open/close sliding sleeves 
between tubing and annulus); 
d) Information gathering via wireline e.g. temperature/pressure surveys; 
e) Repair work by wireline, such as scraping wax from inside tubing. 
Task 2 (20 minutes)  
Delegates from each Member State in the group briefly describe the process they adopt when they 
receive a well operation notification. By discussion, identify suggestions for good/best practise and 
any areas where further improvements could be facilitated by the EUOAG or the OSD Review. 
Task 3 (30 minutes) 
As a group, come to a consensus about the adequacy of the suggested minimum information for 
each of the OSD Annex 1(4) well operation notification requirements in the attached table.  
(Discussion on the independent verification of the well should be the priority).   
Identify any areas where MS require different or additional information. 
Report back to plenary on all tasks (5 minutes per group) 
A “well operation” means any operation concerning a well that could result in the 
accidental release of materials that has the potential to lead to a major accident, including 
the drilling of a well, the repair or modification of a well, the suspension of well operations 
and the permanent abandonment of a well. [Directive 2013/30/EU, Article 2(23)] 
“Major accident” includes an “incident involving an explosion, fire, loss of well control or 
release of oil […] involving, or with a significant potential to cause, fatalities or serious 
personal injury […] or any major environmental incident […]”. [Directive 2013/30/EU, 
Article 2(1)] 
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Annex : Group Exercise 2 
Well Operations Notifications 
Requirements (as per Annex I.4 of Directive 
2013/30/EU) 
Possible Issues to be covered 
(a) the name and address of the operator of the 
well; 
(b) the name of the installation to be used and 
the name and address of the owner or, in the 
case of a production installation, the contractor 
undertaking drilling activities; 
(c) details that identify the well and any 
association with installations and connected 
infrastructure; 
 
 
Clarity and sufficiency of the information provided. 
(d) information on the well work programme, 
including the period of its operation, details and 
verification of barriers against loss of well 
control (equipment, drilling fluids and cement 
etc.), directional control of the well path, and 
limitations on safe operations in keeping with 
the risk management; 
Does the information about the well work programme include: 
 a clear sequence of operations, with details of the safety-related steps related to well control (e.g. 
tests for formation integrity, casing and tubing pressure, cementing programme, BOP function and 
pressure tests, other barrier testing, etc.); 
 the identification of any pressure, temperature and metallurgical limitations, and how they have 
been incorporated into the programme; 
 confirmation that the programme will be undertaken to good industry practice, and the 
specification of what guidelines and standards will be used? 
 
(e) in the case of an existing well, information 
regarding its history and condition; 
Clarity and sufficiency of the information provided. 
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(f) any details concerning safety equipment to 
be deployed that are not described in the 
current report on major hazards for the 
installation; 
Clarity and sufficiency of the information provided, cross-referenced to the details contained in the relevant 
non-production RoMH.  Such equipment could include that associated with well tests, workover pressure 
control, hydraulic fracturing and coiled tubing/wireline. 
(g) a risk assessment incorporating a 
description of: 
i. the particular hazards associated with 
the well operation including any 
environmental, meteorological and 
seabed limitations on safe operations; 
ii. the subsurface hazards; 
iii. any surface or sub-sea operations 
which introduce simultaneous major 
hazard potential; and 
iv. suitable control measures; 
 
 Is the risk assessment methodology comprehensive, and undertaken by appropriate personnel? 
 Are the identified hazards appropriate for the range of anticipated activities within the given well 
programme? 
 Does the risk assessment identify those specific activities with a potential to cause a major accident 
during the well operation, including loss of well control?  
 From an understanding of the well work programme, are any significant potential risks omitted? 
 Is the risk assessment based on sufficient details about the geological strata and formations, 
including estimated formation pressures, locations of critical strata, types of fluids expected, 
temperatures, presence of toxic gas, areas of particular uncertainty, shallow gas potential, etc.? 
(h) a description of the well configuration at the 
end of operations - i.e. permanently or 
temporarily abandoned; and whether 
production equipment has been placed into the 
well for future use; 
Clarity and sufficiency of the information provided.   
It is expected that the details should include the configuration and design of the wellhead and casing, along 
with any completions and temporary plugging arrangements, 
(i) in the case of a modification to a previously 
submitted notification of well operations, 
sufficient details to fully update the 
notification; 
Where applicable, clarity and sufficiency of the information provided. 
(j) where a well is to be constructed, modified 
or maintained by means of a non-production 
installation, additional information as follows: 
i. a description of any environmental, 
meteorological and seabed limitations on 
 
Clarity and sufficiency of the information provided, which should include: 
 Explanation/confirmation that the environmental, meteorological and seabed conditions are within 
the MODU limitations.   
 There should be clear evidence that appropriate site survey work has been performed (including 
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safe operations, and arrangements for 
identifying risks from seabed and 
marine hazards such as pipelines and 
the moorings of adjacent installations; 
a description of environmental conditions 
that have been taken into account 
within the internal emergency 
response plan for the installation;  
a description of emergency response 
arrangements including arrangements 
for responding in cases of 
environmental incidents that are not 
described in the report on major 
hazards; and 
a description of how the management 
systems of the operator of the well and 
the owner are to be coordinated to 
ensure effective control of major 
hazards at all times; 
shallow seismic, if necessary) to identify issues such as seabed obstructions, anchoring 
considerations, punch-through potential for jack-ups, etc.  
 In relation to the internal emergency response requirements, the information should be clear and 
sufficient when cross-referenced to the details contained in the relevant non-production RoMH.  As 
the RoMH may only have generic information concerning emergency response provisions and 
equipment, the well notification should provide additional arrangements if those generic provisions 
are insufficient in the light of the specific environmental conditions described in the notification. 
 A summary of the Well Operator’s SEMS and its CMAPP will need to be included and will need to be 
assessed against the scope of the well operations and the well operator's responsibilities (those for 
the MODU owner will be considered as part of the RoMH assessment).  
 In relation to the coordination of management systems between the owner and the well operator, 
there should be comprehensive bridging documentation, which should include: 
 The allocation of responsibilities for the range of activities with the well operation, including design 
decisions and well control/testing; 
 The specification of which codes, standards, guidelines and procedures will be followed, 
highlighting areas where there could be conflict with the existing MODU SEMS and processes; 
 Agreed communication routes between well operator and MODU, with details of the management 
structures for the well operator and the MODU owner which are relevant to this particular well 
operation.   
(k) a report with findings of the independent 
well examination, including a statement by the 
operator of the well that, after considering the 
report and findings of independent well 
examination by the independent verifier, the 
risk management relating to well design and its 
barriers to loss of control are suitable for all 
anticipated conditions and circumstances 
 
 The independent verification report is enclosed with the notification, and demonstrates that 
professional and independent assurance has been undertaken on the proposed well design and well 
control measures  
 It is crucial that the Well Operator includes such a formal statement in the notification; 
 If any of the findings/recommendations from the independent well verification have not been 
accepted by the Well Operator, clear, convincing reasons should be given. 
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(l) the information relevant to these regulations 
obtained pursuant to the major accident 
prevention requirements of Directive 
92/91/EEC; 
 
Directive 92/91/EEC has a wider application than Directive 2013/30/EU but is broadly complementary, so 
that details in the RoMH will often cover the same major hazard prevention details.  The onus is on the well 
operator to identify any areas where that is not the case.   
(m) in respect of the well operations to be 
conducted, any information relevant to other 
requirements under these regulations obtained 
pursuant to Directive 2011/92/EU relating to 
the prevention of major accidents resulting in 
significant or serious damage to the 
environment. 
 
 
Information provided in this part of the notification could relate to the potential environmental effects 
arising from a major accident during the well operation, and the technical and non-technical measures 
planned to prevent, reduce or offset them, including monitoring. 
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Group Exercise 3. Weekly Reports of Well Operations 
Objectives: this Group Exercise provides an opportunity for delegates to share their experiences of 
how they respond to receiving the weekly reports of well operations, to compare any differing 
approaches to highlight good practice, and to identify any priorities for action by the EUOAG or the 
OSD Review in the future.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, elect a (different) rapporteur to record the group’s discussions. 
Task 1 (15 minutes) 
Delegates from each Member State in the group briefly describe the process they adopt on receiving 
a weekly well operation report, including how the report is considered /assessed, what issues are 
looked at and in what depth, how quickly this is done, and what actions are taken after this scrutiny.  
Task 2 (15 minutes)  
As a group, identify:  
a) The value and relevance of the information contained in these reports;   
b) Good practice for responding to weekly well operation reports; 
c) Any areas which could be taken forward by the EUOAG or the OSD Review to further improve 
how Competent Authorities use these reports of well operation progress. 
 
Report back to plenary (5 minutes per group) 
 
 
  
Directive 2013/30/EU Annex II 
Weekly reports of well operations should include: 
a) the name and address of the operator of the well; 
b) the name of the installation and the name and address of the operator or owner; 
c) details that identify the well and any association with installations or connected infrastructure 
d) a summary of the operations undertaken since the commencement of operations or since the 
previous report; 
e) the diameter and true vertical and measured depths of: 
i. any hole drilled; and 
ii. any casing installed; 
f) the drilling fluid density at the time of making the report; and 
g) in the case of operations relating to an existing well, its current operational state. 
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Group Exercise 4. Notifications of Combined Operations 
Objectives: this Group Exercise provides an opportunity for delegates to develop consensus about 
activities which come within the definition of “combined operations”, to share different Competent 
Authority approaches to such notifications, and to identify any priorities for action by the EUOAG or 
the OSD Review in the future.     
 
 
 
 
 
First, elect a (different) rapporteur to record the group’s discussions. 
Task 1 (15 minutes) 
List examples of activities which the Group considers are combined operations, and also those 
activities which are outside the definition.  Highlight any situations where there is uncertainty or 
differing interpretations.  
Task 2 (15 minutes)  
Delegates from each Member State in the group briefly describe the process they adopt on receiving 
combined operation notifications, including how the notification is considered /assessed, what issues 
are looked at and in what depth, and what actions are taken after this scrutiny.  
Task 3 (15 minutes) 
As a group, consider each aspect of the JRC guidelines on combined operations (see Annex).  What 
additional issues should be included in the CA assessment? 
Task 4 (10 minutes) 
As a group, identify:  
a) Good practice for responding to combined operations notifications; 
b) Any issues which could be taken forward by the EUOAG or the OSD Review to further 
improve how Competent Authorities consider combined operations notifications. 
 
Report back to plenary (5 minutes per group) 
 
  
A “combined operation” means an operation carried out from an installation with another 
installation or installations for purposes related to the other installation(s) which thereby materially 
affect the risks to the safety of persons or the protection of the environment on any or all of the 
installations.  [Directive 2013/30/EU, Article 2(25)]. 
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Combined Operations Notifications – some practical issues3 
Initial scrutiny 
1.  From an initial quick scrutiny, ensure that the original combined operations notification provides 
all the information required by the Directive, including: 
 A clear agreement that all the parties in the combined operation agree with the contents of 
the notification 
 A clear description of the actual operation, and the programme for this work 
 Description of any equipment which is to be used in the combined operation and which is 
not described in the current RoMHs for either installation 
 A bridging document, authorised by all the parties, which sets out how the management 
systems of the two installations will be coordinated 
 A summary of the risk assessment, including specifically:- 
i. A description of any operation during the combined operations programme which 
has the potential to cause a major accident 
ii. A description of any risk control measures which are introduced as a result of the risk 
assessment 
If the notification does not cover all these specific issues (and any other issues specifically required 
by your own legislation), return the notification and “re-set” the deadline for your CA response. 
General issues 
2.  Remember that the combined operations notification is in addition to the normal RoMH 
arrangements for the two installations involved.  Therefore the scrutiny of the combined operations 
notification should focus on the interactions between the two installations, issues over and above 
the individual RoMHs. However, the RoMHs for the two installations involved (which will have 
already been accepted by your CA) will be essential reference documents during this work.  The 
notification supplements the generic combined operation arrangements of the RoMH. 
3.  A large percentage of combined operations will also involve a well operations notification.  Ensure 
your scrutiny system of the two linked notifications is well coordinated, with good communication 
between the two teams to ensure each is aware of emerging issues and progress of the others’ 
scrutiny. In particular, some of the technical detail about the well operation will be essential 
background for the scrutiny of the combined operation notification (e.g. whether the well is HPHT, 
likely presence of H2S, the identification of any meteorological or seabed limitations, the extent of 
the well programme itself etc.).    
4.  Key areas for assessment of the combined operations notification include:- 
Risk assessment 
a) What is the quality and thoroughness of the risk assessment work done for the combined 
operation programme? Has a systematic approach been adopted to assess the risk impact of 
the joint operation? Does the risk assessment cover the whole life cycle of the combined 
operations? This is not just a re-run of the risk assessments undertaken within the 
                                           
3 Walker, S., Konstantinidou, M., Contini, S., Zhovtyak, E., Tarantola, S., Guidelines for the Assessment of 
Reports on Major Hazards based on the requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU - Summary and highlights of 
the JRC training course under the Virtual Centre of Offshore Safety Expertise [EUR 28693 EN, Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2017, ISBN 978-92-79-70670-7, doi:10.2760/608404, 
JRC107405] 
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respective RoMHs, but will include the identification of the additional risks (or increases to 
existing risks) that the combined operation will cause to either installation.  
b) Have site specific issues been taken into account during the risk assessment and the 
selection of controls?  Examples could include structural loadings (such as loading from 
additional temporary equipment or the interaction of MODU spud cans on installation piles 
or subsea furniture), any restrictions during the combined operation (such as vulnerable 
topside structures or sea state limits), and increase in marine activity (e.g. anchor handling 
operations) 
Management arrangements 
a) Are the anticipated management arrangements for combined operations, as laid down in the 
respective RoMHs, being followed?  If not why not and what are the consequences? 
b) How was the bridging document arrived at?  Was it the result of a formal GAP analysis of the 
SEMS and procedures between the two installations, or does it just follow a “standard” 
format? Is it comprehensive? 
c) When the combined operations concerns well operations, is it is absolutely clear whose well 
control manual take precedence?  Is this liable to cause competency problems on either 
installation?  
d) Are the overall decision, command and control arrangements described, and appropriate? 
e) Have the interface arrangements been tested before the combined operation commences? 
For instance, a Drilling the Well on Paper exercise (DWOP) is a common practise to test 
interface arrangements prior to a combined operations starting. 
f) How are third party contractors included in the interfacing arrangements? 
g) What is the induction process for staff/contractors working on the other’s installation? 
Emergency response 
a) Has the need for any changes in the emergency response arrangements been 
considered? Is the layout, availability and capacity of emergency evacuation and escape 
still appropriate for the two installations working in combination?  Are any of the existing 
escape routes or equipment compromised? Has any increase in the numbers on board 
been taken into account?  
b) Has the internal emergency response plans of both installations been assessed and 
amended to take into account the combined operation?   Has that of the non-production 
installation been submitted with the combined operations notification? Have the oil spill 
response/effectiveness of both installations been updated to take into account the 
specific nature of the combined operations?  
  
 33 
Group Exercise 5. Competent Authority transparency and documentation 
Objectives: this Group Exercise provides an opportunity for delegates to consider how to better meet 
the openness/transparency requirements of the OSD, and to develop consensus about the scope of 
formal OSD documentation such as Competent Authority annual plans, guidance and policy 
statements. Identify any priorities for action by the EUOAG or the OSD Review in the future.   
First, elect a (different) rapporteur to record the group’s discussions. 
Task 1 (20 minutes) 
As a group, consider the table of anonymised results of how EUOAG Competent Authorities have 
delivered the Directive 2013/30/EU transparency requirements in the attached paper.  What could 
be the reasons for such differing standards? Choosing a number of the categories, establish the 
minimum website content which you think would be sufficient to meet the intentions of the 
Directive for Competent Authority openness 
Task 2 (15 minutes)  
 
 
 
 
As a group, consider the requirement for Competent Authorities to prepare annual plans of their 
“effective oversight”: 
 What should be included in the plans? 
 How detailed should the annual plans be? 
 Should they be shared with the industry?  
 What should annual plans be used for? 
 Delegates from each Member State in the group briefly describe their own annual plans – do 
they match with the group’s views of content/style?  
Task 3 (15 minutes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 As a group, consider the purpose of the Directive’s requirement to have such a “policy 
statement”. Is it important? What does it achieve?  
 Delegates briefly explain how their country has implemented this requirement. In group 
discussion, identify good/best practises. 
 To help group discussion, consider the following Competent Authority “policy statement”: 
“Competent Authority X will ensure that the offshore oil & gas industry meets the requirements of the 
Offshore Safety Law by undertaking scrutiny of submissions and by inspection.  Enforcement action 
Competent Authorities are responsible for making “annual plans for effective oversight, including 
inspections, of major hazards based on risk management and with particular regard to compliance 
with the RoMHs and other document […]” [Directive 2013/30/EU, Article 21(3)]. 
Competent Authorities “prepare a policy statement describing the aims of oversight and enforcement, 
and the obligations […] to achieve transparency, consistency, proportionality and objectivity in its 
regulation of offshore oil & gas operations”.  [Directive 2013/30/EU, Annex III (1)(1)(b)] 
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will be taken when appropriate, and X’s authority activities will always be transparent, consistent, 
proportionate and objective.”  
o Does this policy statement meets the Directive’s requirements? 
o What could be done to make it a more useful statement? 
 
Report back to plenary (5 minutes per group) 
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Paper for Group Exercise 5: How transparent are EU Offshore Competent Authorities?  
Background 
1. In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico is April 2010, there was 
considerable concern from European politicians, NGOs and the public about the adequacy of controls 
over the offshore oil and gas in European waters. Initial responses showed a general mistrust in 
existing MS offshore regulators, often through lack of knowledge and understanding about how 
existing offshore regulators operated.  This concern even culminated in demands from some quarters 
of the creation of an EU “controller of controllers” over Member States’ offshore safety and 
environmental regulators.  
2. Although that rhetoric died down somewhat, within 6 months the Commission published a formal 
Communication4 to the European Parliament and Council entitled “Facing the challenge of the safety 
of offshore oil and gas activities” to start a dialogue about the improvements which could be 
required.  The majority of the suggested changes were focused on the offshore industry itself, but 
the Communication expressed concern about the fragmented and insular nature of EU offshore 
regulators, with one of the five key issues identified being the need for improved controls by public 
authorities.  It stated that: 
“….the regime must provide for a high level of transparency, enabling …. public authorities to 
demonstrate to any interested party that activities that carry risks to life, environment or 
property are appropriately … controlled.”  
Transparency requirements in Directive 2013/30/EU 
3. The new model for public oversight which the Communication put forward stressed the 
importance of public authority transparency and the active engagement with the general public and 
other stakeholders. This drive for better transparency and openness of public authority affairs 
following Deepwater Horizon was eventually translated into parts of Directive 2013/30/EU, such as 
requirements to take into account views expressed during public participation into planned offshore 
exploration operations. In relation to Competent Authorities, the Directive had a number of Articles 
to promote openness and transparency:- 
a) OSD Art. 8(4). A description of how the CA is organised, and why it has been established in 
the way it is, to be made available to the public.  That description should include how the CA 
undertakes its main functions and how it complies with the requirement to be independent 
and objective.  
b) OSD Art. 9(d). Summaries of the CA policy, process and procedures for assessing reports and 
notifications and for overseeing compliance by way of inspections, investigations and 
enforcement, should be made available to the public (and the policy/process/procedures 
themselves made available to operators and owners).  
c) OSD Art. 24 and Commission Regulation 1112/2014. Establishing a common data format for 
publishing details of offshore installations, numbers of CA 
inspections/investigations/enforcement actions, and incident data.  
d) OSD Art. 26 (2). Non-confidential versions of major accident investigations to be publically 
available.  
e) OSD Art. 29(3). External emergency response plans should be made available to the public.  
4. How have EU Competent Authorities responded to this drive for greater openness about their 
operation, now that the various transitional arrangements for Directive 2013/30/EU have past? To 
                                           
4 COM(2010)560 
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provide background information for the JRC Workshop for Offshore Competent Authorities in Ispra 
26-28 November 2018, this paper reports on the findings of an informal survey which was 
undertaken to look at the information which all EU Competent Authorities are now required to make 
available to the public. 
The survey 
5.  It was expected that Competent Authorities would choose to make maximum use of their 
websites to provide information to the public.  Therefore, the author of this paper acted as a “secret 
shopper” by visiting the websites of 10 EU offshore Competent Authorities to assess the quality and 
scope of the information which was presented there.  The survey looked for 
a) User-friendliness of the information.  Was it easy to navigate? Was the language and style 
suitable for non-informed members of the public or offshore workers? Was the information 
current? 
b) Information about how the Competent Authority was organised.  Was it clear? If the CA was 
a partnership, did the website link to the partners? Were management charts available? Was 
contact information clear? 
c) An explanation about why the Competent Authority has been established in the way it is. 
d) An explanation of how the Competent Authority manages its obligations to be independent 
and objective 
e) The “summary” of the Competent Authority’s policies, process and procedures. Was one 
available? Was it clear and suitable for its audience? Did the summary cover the full range of 
the Competent Authority’s functions and activities? 
f) A system for confidential reporting of concerns.  Was this easy to locate on the website? 
Was the process of reporting concerns easy?  Was there sufficient information to 
reassurance complainants that they would remain anonymous? Was there a commitment to 
feed back any results of investigation? 
g) Common data format information.  How was this presented? 
h) Major accident investigations.  Was there a system for making non-confidential versions of 
major accident investigations available? 
i) External emergency response plans.  How could the public see them? Were the 
arrangements easy? If other national authorities were responsible for this, were there links 
to those other websites/documentation? 
j) Any information beyond the minimum requirements of the Directive Did the website 
provide public information about the Competent Authority activities beyond the minimum 
specified in the OSD?  
6.  The anonymised results are summarised in the table below, using the common R-O-G rating 
system5.  This (albeit crude) analysis shows that there was significant variation in the quality of 
transparency/openness which EU Competent Authorities demonstrated from their websites, and 
indicates that some MS may still have further work to implement arrangements to meet these 
requirements of the OSD.   
 
 
 
                                           
5 RED = significant omissions, with key information missing, out-of-date or inadequately presented. 
  ORANGE = some information provided, but not comprehensive. Presentation could be improved.   
  GREEN = clear and easy to understand, substantially covering all the necessary information. 
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HOW TRANSPARENT ARE EU OFFSHORE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES? 
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by 
contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see https://europa.eu/european-
union/contact_en). 
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